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Max Weber's View of Objectivity in Social Science
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Essay
Max Weber's View of Objectivity in Social Science
By Steve Hoenisch
Last updated on May 8, 2006
Copyright 1996-2006
www.Criticism.Com
This essay named best of the web for social science in 2003 by Encyclopaedia
Britannica.
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and Indeterminacy
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Comments and Kudos
Resources
Weber:
Political Writings
Books on and by Max Weber
Table of Contents
1 Facts and Values
2 Stating the Standpoints
3 Adhering to Values
4 A Two-Tiered Approach to Value-Free Social Science
5 Ruling Out Objectivity Prior to Perspective
6 Establishing a Value Prior to Analysis
7 Dual Legacy
8 Notes
9 Related
1 Facts and Values
Max Weber thought that "statements
of fact are one thing, statements of value another, and any confusing
of the two is impermissible," Ralf Dahrendorf writes in his essay
"Max Weber and Modern Social Science," acknowledging that
Weber clarified the difference between
pronouncements of fact and of value.
1 Although Dahrendorf goes on to note the ambiguities in
Weber's writings between factual analysis and value-influenced pronouncements,
he stops short of offering an explanation for them other than to say
that Weber, being human, could not always live with his own demands
for objectivity. Indeed, Dahrendorf leaves unclear exactly what Weber's
view of objectivity was. More specifically, Dahrendorf does not venture
to lay out a detailed explanation of whether Weber believed that the
social scientist could eliminate the influence of values from the analysis
of facts.
Did Weber believe that, even though
facts are one thing and values another,
social and economic facts could be
evaluated without the analysis being
influenced by values? And what is the
relation of objectivity to values? Could
objectivity, for instance, be used to
show that one value is superior to
another? Or does objectivity apply only
to the analysis of facts? Do one's
values or perspective stem from human
nature, metaphysical views, personal
identity, or is it just as likely that
they are a mere construct of culture?
These questions, and others like
them, underlie much that has been
considered ambiguous in Max Weber's writings: His
methodology. Since his death,
sociologists and political scientists
have been disputing where Weber stood
with regard to questions
concerning the
relationship of objectivity to facts and
values. "Most of Weber's
commentators," Edward Bryan Portis
writes, "have assumed his advocacy
of the fact-value dichotomy, despite his
explicit and implicit assertions to the
contrary, because of his numerous
statements denying the ability of
science to refute any normative position
or to help one choose among contending
normative orientations."
2 Indeed,
hardly a scholarly piece is written on
Weber, it seems, without the preamble
that Weber's views on this subject have
been widely misunderstood, with the
implication that the scholar at hand
intends to finally set the record
straight.
This essay has more humble ambitions.
Although it takes issue in the final
section with part of the exhaustive view
laid out by
Portis, this essay does not
purport to set forth yet another
definitive interpretation of Weber's
views on objectivity. Rather it seeks to
shed light on Weber's view of the
applicability of objectivity by
attempting to answer the overarching
question that sits at the foundation of
those posed above: Was Weber an advocate
of value-free social science?
The answer, as will be shown, is both
yes and no -- because, this essay will
argue, Weber maintained a two-tiered
approach to value-free social science.
On the one hand, he believed that
ultimate values could not be justified
"scientifically," that is,
through value-free analysis. Thus, in
comparing different religious, political
or social systems, one system could not
be chosen over another without taking a
value or end into consideration; the
choice would necessarily be dictated by
the analyst's values. On the other hand,
Weber believed that once a value, end,
purpose, or perspective had been
established, then a social scientist
could conduct a value-free investigation
into the most effective means within a
system of bringing about the established
end. Similarly, Weber believed that
objective comparisons among systems
could also be made once a particular end
had been established, acknowledged, and
agreed upon, a position that allowed
Weber to make what he considered
objective comparisons among such
economic systems as capitalism and
socialism. Thus, even though Weber
maintained that ultimate values could
not be evaluated objectively, this
belief did not keep him from believing
that social problems could be
scientifically resolved -- once a
particular end or value had been
established.
Top
2 Stating the Standpoints
But
first, just what is Weber's own
standpoint, as determined by his
ultimate values? It is, no doubt,
influenced by one of his key concerns:
"the quality of human being in any
given economic and social order."
3
Sometimes, however, his standpoint is
nationalistic. And in yet other essays,
it champions individual liberty. Indeed,
Weber's perspective changes, and it is
likely to be driven not by one value but
by levels of them, ranging from humanism
to a concrete objective. But the fact
that Weber had a perspective lends
little support to the two-tiered
interpretation, other than to show that
he believed it was permissible for a
social scientist to possess a
value-determined standpoint. His
treatment of perspective is another
matter, however.
One hint that begins to shed light on
Weber's view on the fact-value question
is a characteristic that recurs in
several of Weber's essays and speeches:
Weber
announces, often at the beginning
of a speech or essay, the standpoint
from which he plans to evaluate a given
situation or set of facts. Likewise, if
he changes his focus during a
presentation, he often declares the new
standpoint. In his opening remarks of
"The Nation State and Economic
Policy," one of Weber's early
speeches, he sets a precedent for this
pattern while unveiling a justification
for his perspective. The "inaugural
lecture is an opportunity," Weber
says, "to present and justify
openly the personal and, in this sense,
`subjective' standpoint from which one
judges economic phenomena,"
revealing that he maintained that even
the examination of such seemingly hard
data as economic facts were subject to
the influence of a perspective
determined by values.
4 When
Weber shifts course
later in the speech
to prescribing what should be done to
deal with the problems on Germany's
eastern frontier, he discloses his new
perspective: "the standpoint of the
German people."
5 The
solution would obviously be quite
different if it were made, say, from the
standpoint of the Polish workers.
Similarly, in one of his later lectures,
"The Profession and Vocation of
Politics," Weber tells his audience
near the beginning of his remarks that
he will expose "the political
deficiency of this system ... from the
standpoint of success."
6
Although Weber often announces the
value from which he intends to analyze a
particular policy, he also acknowledges
that the value may be merely a construct
of one's culture or society. An example
of the influence of culture upon
perspective lies in Weber's comments
about political economy. As soon as the
method of analysis known as political
economy makes value judgments, Weber
says, "it is tied to the particular
strain of humankind (Menschentum) we
find within our own nature. ... The
economic policy of a German state, and,
equally, the criterion of value used by
a German economic theorist, can
therefore only be a German policy or
criterion."
7 Yet the
perspective still must be acknowledged.
Regardless of whether a social
scientist's value-orientation stems from
cultural norms,
nationality, or a
worldview, what remains certain for
Weber is that the value is neither
intrinsic to the subject matter nor
specific to its context -- a view that
categorically separates value from
facts. Weber takes care to refute such
views in his discussion of the
methodology of political economy in
"The Nation State and Economic
Policy." First, Weber assails those
economists who maintain that political
economy can derive its own ideals from
the subject matter. The notion that
there are independent or socio-political
ideals shows itself to be a delusion as
soon as one delves into the literature
in an attempt to identify the basis for
its evaluation, Weber says.
8 "The
truth is that the ideals we introduce
into the subject matter of our science
are not peculiar to it, nor are they
produced by this science itself."
9 Rather,
the values stand above the subject
matter; they are of a higher order. For
Weber, it is less important what another
analyst's core values are than whether
he clarifies them for the benefit of
both himself and his audience.
Weber also criticizes those
scientists who often "unconsciously
allow the starting point for our
analyses and explanations of economic
events to determine our
judgements
of these events,"
10
demonstrating that he separates the
subjectivity of value-orientation from
the objective evaluation that is carried
out after the value orientation has been
established. In other words, Weber is
chastising those scientists who allow
the subjectivity of their perspective to determine their analysis of the
facts. As examples of the economic
scientists who have made this mistake,
Weber points to the historical
apologists and to the Marxists.
Top
3 Adhering to Values
What matters even more to Weber is
whether one adheres unflinchingly to his
values. In "The Profession and
Vocation of Politics," Weber
explicitly articulates
how one must look
at life from a chosen value: "What
matters is not age but the trained
ability to look at realities of life
with an unsparing gaze, to bear these
realities and be a match for them
inwardly."
11 The
comment exposes the inherent
relationship, for Weber, between
value-free analysis and value-driven
moral action, a dichotomy that
resurfaces in Weber's discussion of an
ethics of commitment and an ethics of
responsibility. To be "a match for
them inwardly" is to cling to one's
values even in the face of the
inevitable "polar night of icy
darkness."
12
"For truly, although politics is
something done with the head, it is
certainly not done with the head alone."
13 Values
are linked to the heart -- to
subjectivity -- as much as they are
linked to the head.
Weber himself seems to adhere to his
own values -- or at least he argues
repeatedly for the veracity of one
`cause' over another. Perhaps this is
among the trends that have led many
Weber scholars astray, especially since
"Weber feels that no cause can be
`proved', simply by intellectual means,
to be superior to any other."
14 Despite
his own attachment to, for example, the
values of individual liberty, his
"philosophical stance did not
provide a mechanism for validating
democratic values in and of
themselves."
15
How
can Weber's arguments for his ultimate
values be reconciled with the view that
value-free analysis can be conducted
only after a value or purpose has been
established? Lassman and Speirs, in
their introduction to Weber:
Political Writings, provide the
answer. "Although Weber believed
that values could not be given any form
of `ultimate' foundation, it was
possible and indeed necessary"
16 to
argue for them because "the
tensions between competing values are
essential in order to prevent cultural
stagnation."
17 Even
though Lassman and Speirs do not explain
precisely how it is possible to put
forth objective arguments supporting
subjective values while maintaining a
commitment to truth, they do allude to
one solution: Weber's "scholarly
investigations and political essays have
the purpose of making clear, in an
objective manner as possible, the
realities and possibilities given in any
particular situation."
18
Top
4 A Two-Tiered Approach to Value-Free Social Science
Having examined Weber's views of the
role of perspective and values in social
scientific analysis, the evidence, both
from Weber's writings and from
commentaries on them, must now be
considered in support of the
interpretation that Weber took a
two-tiered approach to value-free social
science.
First, it must be shown that held
Weber believed ultimate values could not
be proved scientifically, a position
alluded to in several preceding remarks.
Lassman and Speirs, writing in their
introduction to Weber: Political
Writings, address the matter
directly. Weber held the belief, they
say, that "there is no longer any
possibility of an objective ranking of
ultimate values or moral
principles."
19
Weber's own writings support Lassman
and Speirs' conclusion that Weber
considered ultimate values and their
subsequent political values to be
subjectively
determined. For instance,
in "Between Two Laws" Weber
writes that certain communities are able
to provide the conditions for not only
such "bourgeois" values as
citizenship and true democracy,
"but also much more intimate and
yet eternal values, including artistic
ones."
20 The
language that Weber uses to characterize
these two types of values leads to the
interpretation that he held them to be a
subjective matter. Regarding the first
set of values, labeling them
"bourgeois" brings to light
their contingent nature: They are the
product of a class, a strata. Regarding
the second set, the labels
"intimate" and
"eternal" clearly set them
apart from any objective foundation. An
"intimate" value is by
definition personal, an opinion.
Further: It carries the connotation of
emotion, of mystification. Likewise with
"eternal."
This element of mystification, of
faith in what is ultimately unknown and
unknowable, materializes in other pieces
of evidence that help substantiate
Weber's view that ultimate values cannot
be objectively established. "The nature
of the cause the politician seeks to
serve by striving for and using power is
a question of faith."
21 Yet
here Weber refers to the politician, not
the social scientist. But could the same
theorem not be applied to the social
scientist? Could "social
scientist" not be substituted for
"politician" and, say,
"facts" for "power"?
And then could the social scientist not
be asked to use those facts objectively
while maintaining a commitment to his
values? Answering these questions in the
affirmative, which can be done only
through an argument by extension, a
frail but not hopeless step, leads to
interpreting "The Profession and
Vocation of Politics" as a metaphor
for the actions of the social scientist,
showing that the values he seeks to
serve are also a question of faith.
The argument by extension
notwithstanding, there is other evidence
that Weber held the social scientist's
values to be a subjective matter. Portis,
for instance, says Weber "believed
it impossible to justify ultimate values
scientifically. He presumed they were
derived from the metaphysical
commitments that define one's general
outlook."
22 Rogers
Brubaker, in The Limits of
Rationality, also acknowledges that
Weber's discussion of value orientations
amplifies those of a long line of
ethical relativists. Weber believed that
"value orientations are essentially
subjective, and that conflict among them
cannot be rationally resolved."
23
Furthermore, Weber believed that
value orientations could not be
eliminated from social scientific work.
They necessarily determine the analyst's
perspective.
Portis writes that Weber,
in his Freiburg inaugural address, said
"political economy was a `political
science,' in the sense that it must
proceed from a value perspective."
24 More
crucially, Portis goes on to quote Weber
as writing that "`there is no
"objective" scientific
analysis of culture ... or "social
phenomena" independent of special
and "one-sided" viewpoints --
expressly or tacitly, consciously or
unconsciously -- they are selected,
analyzed, and organized for expository
purposes.'"
25
Top
5 Ruling Out Objectivity Prior to Perspective
But
how, given this assertion by Weber, can
he be seen to advocate a value-free
analysis once a perspective has been
established? The first hint lies in the
quotation itself. Weber does say that
there is no objective analysis
"independent of special and
'one-sided' viewpoints," a remark
that does not rule out objectivity, only
objectivity prior to a perspective.
This interpretation of Weber's
position derives additional support from
other comments Weber made regarding
objectivity. Example: One of the
"deadly sins in the area of
politics" is, Weber says, "a
lack of objectivity."
26 The
objectivity, however, can engage only
after a value has been established;
otherwise, this remark is logically
inconsistent with Weber's statement that
"the nature of the cause the
politician seeks to serve by striving
for and using power is a question of
faith." The two statements, taken
together, imply that once a political
position -- a value or perspective --
has been established, the politician
must hold to the ideal of objectivity.
Furthermore, without resorting to the
two-tiered interpretation of Weber's view
of value-free social science, it would
be difficult to reconcile Weber's
comment that a lack of objectivity is a
sin with the comment that there is no
objective analysis independent of
special viewpoints.
Lassman and Speirs supply another
piece of evidence for the view that
Weber believed a subjective end had to
be established before objective analysis
could proceed. They write: "The
`disenchantment' that Weber described
did not stop with liberalism. The
traditional philosophical foundations of
all political ideologies and doctrines
were threatened by a relentless
undermining of their own
presuppositions." This extract
reveals that Weber, at least in Lassman
and Speirs' view, was interested in
analyzing from an objective viewpoint
the makeup of various political systems
-- but it also shows that the objective
analysis could only be carried out once
the purpose of the system, i.e., the
ultimate value upon which it is based,
is identified and acknowledged.
Thus
it seems, both by default and
implication, that Weber believed the
political analyst could adhere to the
principle of objectivity once an value
or perspective had been laid out. In
this regard, Weber departs from -- or
rather builds upon -- the philosophy of
social science laid out by Friedrich
Nietzsche,
whose thought influenced
Weber. Nietzsche's perspectivism
maintains that all interpretation is
necessarily mediated by perspective,
making analysis unavoidably laden with
biases, presuppositions, values, and so
forth. Weber builds on Nietzsche's
perspectivism by maintaining that
objectivity is still possible -- but
only after a particular perspective,
value, or end has been established. For
the politician, the question of value is
a choice of a faith; but once it is
made, it should be pursued by objective
means. For the social scientist, value
necessarily determines perspective and
influences the facts chosen for
analysis, but once those decisions are
made, the social scientist is bound by
the principle of objectivity.
The work of Weber scholars supports
this conclusion. Brubaker, for instance,
affirms the two-tiered interpretation of
Weber's view regarding objectivity:
"The selection of means to a
given end can be assessed in terms of
its objective rationality, since it is
possible to discriminate objectively --
for Weber, scientifically -- between
adequate and inadequate means. But the
notion of objective rationality does not
apply to wertrational action --
to action conceived as intrinsically
rather than as instrumentally valuable,
as an end in itself rather than as means
to some further end."
27
Portis agrees, writing that Weber
came to believe that empirical methods,
in social science, could distinguish
between true and false beliefs only when
researchers took a distinct orientation
toward their own ultimate values.
28
Top
6 Establishing a Value Prior to Analysis
On another level, however, Portis
also argues that Weber nevertheless
maintained that political activity and
social science are incompatible
pursuits, and this is where Portis'
interpretation of Weber's thought on
objectivity goes afoul.
Weber, he says, "denied that
objectivity would be equated with
impersonality or that it was possible
for thought to be compartmentalized into
normative and objective
categories."
29
As a result, Portis maintains, Weber
argued that a social scientist who
engaged in political activity rendered
inauthentic the test of his propositions
against reality. Thus, Weber's
perspective, Portis contends, is that
politics are autonomous from science
both in principle and in practice.
Portis is partly right. Yet he is
also partly wrong. He accurately
portrays Weber's first-level view that
denies the existence of either positive
or natural law, affirming the fact-value
dichotomy: "The categories through
which social phenomena are perceived
must be radically subjective, derived
from priorities that the investigator
brings to work rather than universal
laws discovered through systematic
observation."
30 Portis,
however, soon goes astray -- or just
does not go far enough -- in
characterizing Weber's view of the
fact-value dichotomy: "Because
these categories are antecedent to
social scientific analysis, social
problems cannot be scientifically
resolved."
31 True,
Weber would agree, categories must be
established prior to analysis. Once
established, these categories also
entail ends, and it is by working
objectively toward those ends that
allows the social scientist to resolve a
given social problem scientifically.
Moreover, if one accepts Weber's view
that objectivity can be applied to
social and economic problems only after
a distinct value orientation has been
established, it follows that political
action does not corrupt a social
scientist's objectivity as long as the
scientist's perspective or values are
explicitly acknowledged.
The crucial element that Portis
overlooks is that by choosing
categories, by establishing a value
prior to analysis, as the social
scientist must, he is necessarily making
decisions that are inherently political
in nature. Given this, the converse of Portis' conclusion in fact holds: That a
social scientist cannot engage in
objective analysis without taking
overt political action, because the
choice of values is itself a political
act. From this it follows that science
and politics are, for Weber, not
mutually exclusive; rather, they are
mutually inclusive. The social
scientist cannot proceed with objective
analysis until after his values or
perspective have been established, an
act which is political, whether
conscious or not, whether announced to
others or not.
On objectivity and meaning: In Interpretation
and Indeterminacy in Discourse Analysis, I argue a hard line:
The exact meaning of a speaker's
utterance in a contextualized exchange is often indeterminate.
Top
7 Dual Legacy
Thus,
despite Portis' ideal vision of Weber's
thought to the contrary, social science
and political activity are compatible:
The social scientist, in conducting
research and analyzing facts, is
necessarily influenced by his political
position, at least to the extent
determined by his ultimate values. Weber
knew this, and exhorted his fellow
social scientists to clarify both for
themselves and for others the values
driving their investigations. Such a
clarification is the prerequisite to
objective analysis of facts with a
particular purpose or value in mind.
Furthermore, again despite Portis'
claims to the contrary, part of the
power and allure of Weber lies in the
dual legacy that he handed down: He
succeeded, at least in the totality of
his work, in being overtly
political
while remaining true to his integrity as
a social scientist. At least one work by
Weber -- his short essay titled
"The President of the Reich"
-- directly bears this out. And even if,
as Portis argues, Weber did become
psychologically tormented by the tension
he felt between his need to voice his
political views and his need to feel
integrity as a social scientist, what
allowed him, in the end, to succeed in
being both political and scientific was
his two-tiered approach to value-free
social science.
Weber sees the damage inherent in
failing to openly acknowledge one's
values, and the even greater danger in
falling prey to the delusion that the
analyst can evaluate social facts
completely independent of own values.
Weber sums up this position in "The
Nation State and Economic Policy":
"We in particular succumb readily
to a special kind of illusion, namely
that we are able to refrain entirely
from making conscious value judgements
of our own."
32 In
other words, when the analyst fails to
clarify and consciously acknowledge his
values, it is unlikely that he can
conduct the subsequent analysis
impartially. The acknowledgement of a
value orientation is the prerequisite to
objective evaluation.
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8 Notes
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1 Ralf Dahrendorf, "Max Weber
and Modern Social Science,"
Ch. 37, Max
Weber and his Contemporaries,
eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen
Osterhammel (London: The German
Historical Institute/Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 577.
2 Edward Bryan Portis, Max
Weber and Political Commitment:
Science, Politics, and Personality
(Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1986), p. 75.
3 Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs,
"Introduction," Weber:
Political Writings (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), p. xi.
4 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Nation State and
Economic Policy," p. 1.
5 ibid. p. 12.
6 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Profession and Vocation
of Politics," p. 331.
7 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Nation State and
Economic Policy," p. 15.
8 ibid. p. 18.
9 ibid. p. 19.
10 ibid. p. 19.
11 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Profession and Vocation
of Politics," p. 367.
12 ibid. p. 368.
13ibid. p. 367.
14 Weber: Political Writings,
Introduction by Lassman and Speirs,
p. xxiii.
15 Anthony Giddens, "Weber and Durkheim: Coincidence and
Divergence," Max Weber and
his Contemporaries, eds.
Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen
Osterhammel (London: The German
Historical Institute/Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 188.
16 Weber: Political Writings,
Introduction by Lassman and Speirs,
p. xxiv.
17 ibid. p. xviii.
18 ibid. p. xxiii.
19 ibid. p. xxiii.
20 Weber: Political Writings,
"Between Two Laws," p.
76.
21 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Profession and Vocation
of Politics," p. 355.
22 Portis, Max Weber and
Political Commitment, p. 15.
23 Rogers Brubaker, The
Limits of Rationality: An Essay on
the Social and Moral Thought of
Max Weber (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 5
and 6.
24 Portis, Max Weber and
Political Commitment, p. 71.
25 Portis, Max Weber and
Political Commitment, p. 72,
quoting Weber from The
Methodology of Social Sciences,
trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry
A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free
Press, 1949), p. 72.
26 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Profession and Vocation
of Politics," p. 354.
27 Brubaker, The Limits of
Rationality , p. 54.
28 Portis, Max Weber and
Political Commitment , p. 71.
29 ibid. p. 9.
30 ibid. p. 10.
31 ibid. p. 10.
32 Weber: Political Writings,
"The Nation State and
Economic Policy," p. 19.
Top
9 Related
 Goals in Reading Max Weber's Early Works
Interpretation
and Indeterminacy in Discourse Analysis
Durkheim and Educational Systems
Habermas and Discourse Ethics
Wittgenstein on Discourse Analysis
Putnam and Tocqueville on Newspapers
Books on and by Max Weber
Comments and Kudos
Top
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